For MBS, the Moment of Truth Has Arrived

Hormuz all but closed, Bab el-Mandeb under the Houthis’ sway, a deficit financed by borrowing: the prince who wanted to call every shot has no one left to send the bill to.

The bulwark breached at Mukalla

Mocha bequeathed its name to the world. On 10 September 2026, the Yemeni port also handed the Houthis the key to Bab el-Mandeb. The capture of Mayun (Perim) island was confirmed the following day. None of this was inevitable. Tehran’s fingerprints are unmistakable, but the vulnerability was also manufactured in Riyadh—under one man’s authority.

The chronology is unforgiving. A twenty-nine-year-old defence minister, Mohammed bin Salman chose Yemen in March 2015 to launch the war intended to establish his stature. The turning point would come on 30 December 2025, when Saudi aircraft struck cargo unloaded from two ships arriving from Fujairah at Mukalla, described by Riyadh as military support for the Southern Transitional Council, a movement backed by the Emirates. Ten days later, a delegation from that same Council announced its dissolution from Riyadh—an announcement immediately challenged within the movement as having been made under duress—demonstrating, according to former Pentagon official Michael Rubin, MBS’s decision to put his rivalry with Abu Dhabi above strategic stability.

On this reading, he was breaking part of the front holding the Houthis back. Mocha—which had held out for years thanks to Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance—would thus have lost Aden’s support before falling.

Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb: the trap closes

Following the US-Israeli strikes on Iran and the near-closure of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia had turned to Plan B. The East–West Pipeline carried its crude to Yanbu on the Red Sea. Since 11 September, it has been shut down following an attack by drones from Iraq. Stocks at Yanbu would cover only five to seven days of exports, according to traders interviewed by Reuters on 13 September.

Yanbu retains a northern outlet through Suez or SUMED, but at the cost of loading constraints and long detours to Asia. Ships still pass through Bab el-Mandeb; the Houthis say they are targeting Saudi vessels there. Hormuz on one side, Bab el-Mandeb on the other: the export routes grow more complicated, while the bypass itself is at a standstill. MBS, who had built his contingency plan around the Red Sea, had weakened part of the bulwark protecting it.

Unfortunately, oil above $108 a barrel is not enough to save the day, because a producer’s income depends not only on price but also on volume, transport, insurance and security. A barrel that cannot be loaded at Yanbu, or that a shipowner refuses to collect, is worth very little.

The public finances were already under strain before September. Despite an improvement in the second quarter, the first-half deficit reached $42.7 billion, against $44.1 billion projected for the entire year. Riyadh financed it entirely through borrowing. Military spending comes on top of investment and subsidies; it does not explain the deficit on its own.

The same kingdom that claimed it would free itself from oil is borrowing to meet its military commitments and promises of modernisation. The pharaonic NEOM project is being scaled back: according to Semafor, $16 billion has reportedly been earmarked for terminating contracts over 2026–2030. No, the throne is not tottering: the House of Saud survived the seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979, Houthi missiles and the Khashoggi affair.

The social contract as the bills come due

The prince’s real vulnerability lies in the social contract. He has upended the old Saudi compact binding the dynasty to the ulema, the tribes and the consensus among princes, replacing it with a personal pledge to the kingdom’s youth. Obedience in exchange for modernity and prosperity, women at the wheel, the 2034 World Cup… Having removed his counterweights—from Mohammed bin Nayef to the princes locked up at the Ritz-Carlton in 2017—and having served as prime minister since 2022, he decides alone and therefore has no one else to blame. No minister to sack, no ally to accuse, no American to blame for his deliberate decision to build his policy on distrust of Washington.

No, this moment of truth does not herald a fall, even if additions—and above all subtractions—make and unmake reigns. Long deferred, the bills are nevertheless all being presented at once. The project people bought into under the name “MBS” rested on assumptions undermined by its own owner and chief beneficiary. Its fate will now be read in two curves—and in a silence. The number of barrels actually shipped from Yanbu, the risk premium demanded for lending to Riyadh. Finally, the mood of a younger generation promised—not sirens—but concerts and fun.